



AUTONOMY AS SOCIAL INDEPENDENCE: 





I defend my pure social account of global autonomy from Steven Weimer’s 
recent criticisms. In particular, I argue that it does not implicitly rely upon the 
very kind of nonsocial conception of autonomy that it hopes to replace. 
 





In ‘The Autonomous Life: A pure social view’, I defend an account of global 
autonomy according to which an agent is autonomous to the extent to which she is 
resistant to subjection to foreign wills. I argue that this dispositional property of 
resistance to interpersonal subjection is conferred by various base properties, which I 
call ‘autonomy traits’, and that these include many of the standard conditions of 
autonomy, such as a capacity for critical reflection, a sense of self-worth, and 
protection from coercion. Moreover, whilst the list of autonomy traits is potentially 
endless, I suggest that agents require only some set of traits sufficient to push them 
over the threshold of social independence necessary to qualify as globally 
autonomous; the aim of an account of global autonomy, as I see it, is to specify such a 
package of traits that is both feasible and independently valuable. 
 This account, which interprets the idea of self-rule in a negative, social sense 
as requiring resistance to the rule of others, is intended as an alternative and rival to 
traditional accounts of autonomy that interpret the idea of self-rule as rule by some 
form of rational or authentic self. In ‘Autonomy as Rule by the Self’, Steven Weimer 
defends the latter approach. He first objects to the theoretical flexibility of my view, 
arguing that any plausible version of it must require that autonomous agents possess 
at least some ‘internal’ traits, such as critical rationality or integrity. He then gives 
three reasons for thinking that the best explanation of the necessity of these traits must 
appeal to their role in establishing some form of ‘self-ruling “I”’ [2014: 162], thus 
concluding that my account implicitly relies on the very idea of autonomy as rule by 
the self that I claim to reject. These reasons are (1) that positing such a self best 
explains why irrational people lack autonomy, (2) that it explains why irrational 
people cannot be made more autonomous through the acquisition of merely external 
traits, and (3) that appeal to such a self is already implicit in my account of subjection 
to a foreign will.   
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2.  Subjection to a Foreign Will 
 
My account of subjection to a foreign will includes both a reasonable resistance 
condition, according to which I am not subject to your will if I can be reasonably 
expected to resist your influence, and a conformity of wills condition, according to 
which I am not subject to your will if I would endorse your intention to influence me 
were I to know of it [2014: 145-7]. Of these conditions, Weimer writes: 
 
The two aspects of an agent’s identity most commonly identified as the self-
ruling ‘I’ on the understanding of autonomy Garnett rejects—the reflective 
capacities exercised by freely made choices and the sanctioning attitudes 
involved in endorsing influences—are thus accorded a power that no other 
autonomy traits possess . . . This is easily explained on the understanding of 
autonomy as rule by the self: it is because the relevant capacities and attitudes 
partially constitute the agent’s self-ruling ‘I’ that when they take ownership of an 
influence, the agent can be understood to have taken ownership of that influence 
. . . On Garnett’s account, however, there is no principled basis for according 
this influence-authorizing power to these specific traits. After all, he could have 
just as easily bestowed that power upon agent-external traits.1  
[2014: 163] 
 
 Take the conformity of wills condition, which perhaps seems most vulnerable 
to this criticism. The basic idea is this: if you intend to get me to do something, then 
(other things equal) your intention is foreign to me, but your intention can be rendered 
relevantly non-foreign to me by virtue of its conformity or alignment with my own 
will. Importantly, all references to ‘me’ and ‘my own will’ are here understood only 
in their broad, shallow senses; that is, those senses ‘in which everything is attributable 
to me that occurs in my conscious life or figures in the best overall explanation of my 
conscious life and behaviour’ [Scanlon 2002: 170]. Thus the conformity of wills 
condition is intended to presuppose no more than a basic and minimal conception of 
agency [c.f. Garnett 2013: 23; Weimer 2014: 160]. 
 This means, for instance, that if Betty hides Jane’s car keys in order to prevent 
her from driving while drunk, and if Jane drunkenly rails against this interference, 
then she is, on this account, subject to Betty’s foreign will at this time. This is the case 
even if she would endorse Betty’s relevant intention when sober. It does not matter to 
the analysis that her failure to endorse Betty’s intention is here irrational or not her 
‘true’ or ‘authentic’ attitude. All that matters is that Betty’s will is now relevantly 
foreign to Jane—in the broad and shallow sense of ‘Jane’—and that Jane is subject to 
                                                
1 Just to clarify: since I partly define the idea of an autonomy trait in terms of the reasonable resistance 
and conformity of wills conditions, I do not treat these conditions themselves as autonomy traits. An 
autonomy trait is a property that confers on an agent an increased tendency not to be subject to foreign 
wills; the two conditions are parts of an account of what it is to be subject to foreign wills. 
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it. This is intended to capture the fact that there is something prima facie significant—
namely, self-rule or self-direction—being denied to Jane, however justifiably, in her 
present state (more on this below). 
 Thus the conformity of wills requirement may be read as stating that attitudes 
that are literally and shallowly yours are relevantly foreign to me, unless they 
conform with attitudes that are literally and shallowly mine. Their conformity with 
anything else—anything external to me (in the shallow sense of ‘me’)—does not 
render them non-foreign to me (again, in the shallow sense of ‘me’). This is why 
agent-external factors cannot have ‘influence-authorising power’. 
 In this way, my account of subjection to a foreign will rests on some ordinary 
and uncontroversial ideas about which mental attitudes are literally mine and which 
are literally yours. It does not, however, presuppose the familiar ‘deep’ framework of 
identification and alienation integral to standard accounts of autonomy. Hence I need 
not appeal to endorsement by ‘the agent’ (in the deep, italics-worthy sense) of 
influences by means of capacities constitutive of its ‘self-ruling “I”’; I need only 
appeal to endorsement by the agent (in the simple, shallow sense). So while my 
account, like all accounts of autonomy, presupposes a basic account of agency 
(autonomy being, after all, a property of agents), it does not presuppose any 




3. Autonomy, Insanity, and the Good 
 
I turn now to Weimer’s other two reasons for thinking that my account must 
ultimately rest on a more traditional, rule-by-the-self view of autonomy. Both stem 
from a clash of intuitions concerning agents that are insane or highly irrational. 
According to Weimer, first, such agents lack autonomy regardless of their degree of 
immunity to interpersonal subjection; second, increases in such agents’ immunity 
make no difference to their autonomy [2014: 162]. According to me, by contrast, 
irrationality need be no bar to autonomy (though it generally is one in fact). On my 
view, it is conceptually possible for a profoundly irrational agent to live an adequately 
autonomous life, so long as her irrationality does not render her socially vulnerable—
that is, so long as she is well protected, embedded in caring relational networks, and 
supported in pursuing her own (irrational) ends. 
 Unfortunately, the roots of this disagreement run too deep for easy resolution 
in a single discussion note. Nevertheless, I make the following brief points, beginning 
with a couple of clarifications. As should be clear, my view of autonomy is purely 
procedural, in that it places no restrictions at all on the possible content of an 
autonomous person’s beliefs and desires. This is a feature that it shares with many 
contemporary liberal accounts. Yet while most existing procedural accounts include 
some kind of ‘rational competence’ requirement [e.g. Christman 2009], mine does 
not, and this may appear a serious defect. Nevertheless, the distance between my 
account and the others in this matter may be smaller than it seems. This is because 
autonomy, as we have already noted, is a property of agents, and agency, in even its 
most basic sense, requires some minimal degree of rational intelligibility. So one 
cannot discuss the autonomy of a thing unless that thing is minimally rational. I need 
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not, therefore, deny that autonomy presupposes the minimum rationality required for 
agency.2 
 Next, recall that the idea of autonomy does a variety of jobs for us. One of 
them is to mark out actions that genuinely ‘speak for’ their agents in some 
normatively significant sense; this is, for instance, the notion typically at issue in 
discussions of valid consent, democratic legitimacy, and moral responsibility. As I 
explain in my original paper, however, this is not the notion that my account attempts 
to elucidate [Garnett 2014: 148-9; c.f. Weimer 2014: 161]. Hence the claim is not that 
profoundly irrational tokens of consent can be normatively transformative, or that the 
insane are to be held responsible for their actions. Instead, the account aims to 
elucidate autonomy in one of its other modes of employment, in which it serves to 
pick out a specific type of human good; namely, the good of being one’s own ruler 
and of directing one’s own life. The claim that insane or irrational people can be 
autonomous, then, is the claim that they can partake in this aspect of the good. That is, 
whatever other components of a flourishing human life such people lack—reason, 
health, happiness—they need not also lack the ability to live their own lives in their 
own ways. Of course, the mentally ill are often especially vulnerable to interpersonal 
domination, and so tend to lack autonomy in fact. But there is no principled reason 
why they, too, cannot enjoy the good of a life lived on their own terms. 
 That is the claim; why accept it? Two reasons. First, it helps us to a more 
nuanced understanding of some of the moral complexity surrounding our treatment of 
the mentally ill. It helps to make vivid, for instance, the fact that when we coercively 
commit a person to a psychiatric institution, we deny her one aspect of the good, 
namely her ability to live her life in her own way. This is a good that we sacrifice—
though typically with great justification, given the value of the other goods (such as 
physical safety, or the eventual return to reason) for which it is traded. Denying that 
the mentally ill can be autonomous, by contrast, prevents us from seeing any such 
trade-off, and so impoverishes our moral understanding of these cases. In a similar 
vein, my account helps to show how giving psychiatric patients some limited say in 
their treatment can serve to partially reconnect them with the particular good of self-
determination; again, denying that they are capable of autonomy blinds us to this 
potential feature of such policies. 
 Second, in insisting that those whom we judge to be irrational or insane are 
incapable of autonomy we undermine the role that the idea of autonomy is designed 
to play in our political thought. One of the main purposes of the concept, at least in 
the liberal tradition, is to help to carve out a protected space in our thinking for 
misfits, eccentrics and others who fail to conform to our shared norms. An 
autonomous life, as it is sometimes put, is one that marches to the beat of its own 
drum. We have other concepts (in particular, those of reason and morality) with which 
to evaluate the quality of an agent’s self-government; but a person, just like a state, 
may rule herself badly or madly, and rule herself all the same. If we miss this fact 
about autonomy, it seems to me, then we miss the main point of the idea. 
 
Birkbeck College, University of London 
                                                
2 Note, though, that I do deny that autonomous agents need be any more rational than non-autonomous 
agents. The point is simply that both kinds of agent might necessarily possess a minimum degree of 
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